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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Raymond Gene Corbus appeals from the district court's order of restitution 
requiring Corbus to pay for medical expenses incurred by Terry Clark as a result of 
injuries he sustained when he exited Corbus's moving vehicle while Corbus was 
driving recklessly and eluding law enforcement. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
Deputies Christopher Banks and Allen Long attempted to conduct a traffic 
stop on Corbus's truck after he observed it "traveling at least 60 mph in a 35 mph 
zone." (R., p.6; UPSI, p.1.) Corbus turned his headlights off and continued to 
accelerate up to speeds in excess of 100 miles per hour as the deputies, who were 
in separate patrol units, pursued him. (R., p.6; UPSI, p.1.) When Corbus slowed to 
approximately 40 to 50 miles per hour and "attempt[ed] to turn off on a dirt road," his 
passenger, Terry Clark, "jumped out of the vehicle . . . and was knocked 
unconscious." (UPSI, p.1.) Corbus "continued driving another 300 yards before 
hitting a rock and stopping." (UPSI, p.1.) Corbus admitted drinking and 
acknowledged he saw the deputies pursuing him, but indicated he "just wanted to 
keep going." (UPSI, pp.1-2.) Corbus's passenger, Mr. Clark, was flown to Saint 
Alphonsus Medical Center for treatment of his injuries. (UPSI, p.2.) 
Corbus was arrested for and the state subsequently charged him with 
felony eluding, reckless driving, and driving without privileges. (R., pp.16-18.) At his 
arraignment, Corbus pled guilty to reckless driving. (6f19f06 Tr., ppA-17.) 
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Pursuant to a plea agreement, Corbus later entered a conditional guilty plea 
to felony eluding, reserving his right to challenge the denial of his motion to dismiss, 
and the state dismissed the driving without privileges charge. (R., pp.102-04.) The 
written plea agreement also includes the following term: (3) "That the State will 
recommend ... (f) Restitution to be determined for injuries to Terry Clark." (R., 
p.103.) Pursuant to the state's request, the court ordered a restitution report when 
Corbus entered his plea. (5/21/071 Tr., p.22, Ls.2-6; R., p.100.) 
At sentencing, the court imposed a unified five-year sentence with one and 
one-half years fixed for felony eluding and a concurrent 120-day sentence for 
reckless driving. (R., pp.111-13.) The court, however, suspended execution of 
Corbus's sentence and placed him on probation. (R., p.113.) The court did not 
order restitution at the time of sentencing because the state needed additional time 
to prepare the restitution report. (7/16/07 Tr., p.2, Ls.3-6.) Nevertheless, the court 
ordered Corbus to "pay restitution to the victims in the amount to be determined" as 
a condition of probation. (R., p.114.) 
A Restitution Report was filed on August 13,2007, stating the "[gjrand total of 
restitution" for Mr. Clark's medical expenses was $18,203.67. (R., pp.138-39.) On 
September 17, 2007, the court held a hearing regarding restitution at which Corbus 
indicated he did not dispute the amount of restitution due. (R., p.152.) However, for 
reasons which are not clear in the record, the hearing was continued to November 5, 
2007. (R., p.152.) 
1 The date on the transcript heading erroneously reads May 21, 2006, however, the 
correct date is May 21, 2007. (See R., p.95.) 
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On November 4, 2007, Corbus filed a "Notice of Authority" in which he 
"notifie[d]" the "Court and Counsel that the case of State v. Shafer, 2007 Idaho 
32774) (March 8, 2007) (Case Maker), would seem to be the controlling case in this 
matter." (R., p.155.) Corbus further asserted: 
Essentially, [Corbus] argues that the alleged victim's losses in 
this case are not the result of [his] criminal conduct. Basically, 
[Corbus] pled guilty to a charge of Felony Eluding for exceeding the 
speed limit and failing to stop in a timely fashion upon the police 
officer's using their overhead lights and siren. During the course of the 
evasion, the passenger, who was on felony probation, voluntarily 
elected, without [Corbus's] consent, knowledge or intent, leapt [sic] 
from the moving vehicle and sustained traumatic physical injury. 
[Corbus] would ask the Court to take judicial notice of its file in 
State v. Terry Clark, an Elmore County Case, wherein Mr. Clark 
previously admitted to a Probation Violation for having consumed 
alcohol with [Corbus] in [sic] the night in question. [Corbus] submits 
that Mr. Clark leapt from the moving rig in an effort to keep from being 
charged with a Probation Violation, and not as a result of the charge of 
Felony Eluding. 
(R., pp.155-56.) 
At the hearing on November 5, 2007, the state asked for additional time to 
review and respond to Corbus's Notice of Authority. (R., p.157.) The court granted 
the state's request and set the matter over to November 19, 2007. (R., p.158.) 
On November 19, 2007, the state requested additional time to submit its 
position in writing, which the court granted.2 (11/19/07 Tr., pp.1-3.) The parties 
agreed, at that time, to submit the matter for the court's consideration without any 
additional hearings. (Id.) On December 14, 2007, the court entered an Order of 
Restitution for $18,203.67 for medical expenses, concluding there was a "sufficient 
2 The record on appeal does not include a written submission from the state regarding 
restitution, nor does the register of actions reflect any such document was filed prior to the 
entry of the restitution order. 
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causal connection between the conduct for which the defendant was convicted and 
the injuries Mr. Clark sustained." (R., pp.162-65.) Corbus filed a notice of appeal 
timely only from the Order of Restitution. (R., pp.183-85.) 
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ISSUE 
Corbus states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court err by imposing restitution in the amount of 
$18,206.677 
(Appellant's Brief, p.4.) 
The state wishes to rephrase the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court correctly conclude there was a "sufficient causal 
connection" between Corbus's criminal conduct and Mr. Clark's injuries such that Mr. 
Clark was entitled to restitution for his medical expenses? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Correctly Concluded There Was A "Sufficient Causal Connection" 
Between Mr. Clark's Injuries And Corbus's Criminal Conduct Such That Mr. Clark 
Was Entitled To Restitution For His Medical Expenses 
A. Introduction 
Corbus asserts the district court erred in awarding Mr. Clark restitution, 
contending Mr. Clark's injuries were the result of his own "independent, voluntary 
act," not Corbus's criminal conduct. (Appellant's Brief, pp.5-6.) To the contrary, the 
district court correctly concluded there was a sufficient causal connection between 
Corbus's criminal acts of felony eluding and reckless driving such that Mr. Clark was 
entitled to restitution for the injuries he sustained when he exited the moving vehicle. 
Corbus has failed to establish otherwise. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The decision whether to order restitution is committed to the trial court's 
discretion, and the trial court's factual findings in relation to restitution will not be 
disturbed if supported by sUbstantial evidence. State v. Smith, 144 Idaho 687, 692, 
169 P.3d 275, 280 (Ct. App. 2007). 
The appellate court exercises free review over the application and 
construction of statutes. State v. Reyes, 139 Idaho 502,505,80 P.3d 1103, 1106 
(Ct. App. 2003). 
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C. Mr. Clark Is Entitled To Restitution In This Case For The Medical Expenses 
He Incurred As A Result Of Corbus's Criminal Conduct 
Idaho's restitution statutes require Corbus to compensate victims who are 
injured by his criminal actions. I.C. § 19-5302 ("If a district court or magistrate's 
division orders the defendant to pay restitution, the court shall order the defendant to 
pay such restitution to the victim or victims injured by the defendant's actions."); I.C. 
§ 19-5304(2) ("Restitution shall be ordered for any economic loss which the victim 
actually suffers."). "Medical expenses resulting from [Corbus's] criminal conduct" are 
a compensable "economic loss" under the statute. I.C. § 19-5304(1)(a). 
"One of the purposes of restitution is to obviate the need for victims to incur 
the cost and inconvenience of a separate civil action in order to gain compensation 
for their losses." State v. Schultz, 2008 WL 5205887 *2 (Ct. App. 2008) (citations 
omitted). The public policy underlying the statute "favor[s] full compensation to 
crime victims who suffer economic loss." State v. Bybee, 115 Idaho 541, 543, 768 
P.2d 804, 806 (Ct. App. 1989); see also, State v. Wardle, 137 Idaho 808, 811, 53 
P.3d 1227, 1230 (Ct. App. 2002) (noting that "restitution must be directed toward 
correcting a harm or paying a cost that results from the defendant's crime"). 
"Restitution orders also operate for the benefit of the state, in part because they 
promote the rehabilitative and deterrent purposes of the criminal law." State v. Doe, 
146 Idaho 277, _,192 P.3d 1101, 1107 (Ct. App. 2008) (citing State v. Olpin, 140 
Idaho 377, 378, 93 P.3d 708, 709 (Ct. App. 2004)). 
"[O]etermination of economic loss [is] based upon the civil preponderance of 
evidence standard." Doe, 146 Idaho at _, 192 P.3d at 1108 (citing I.C. § 19-
5304(6)). Further, "there must be a causal connection between the conduct for 
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which the defendant is convicted and the damages the victim suffers." Schultz at *2 
(citing State v. Shafer, 144 Idaho 370, 372, 161 P.3d 689, 691 (Ct. App. 2007)). 
On appeal, Corbus "asserts that the district court erred in ordering any 
restitution because there was no evidence that [Mr. Clark's) injuries were the result 
of Mr. Corbus' criminal conduct." (Appellant's Brief, p.5.) Corbus argues Mr. Clark's 
injuries were instead "the result of an independent, voluntary act of [Mr. Clark) to 
jump out of the vehicle as it was moving, in order to potentially escape for allegedly 
violating his probation." (Appellant's Brief, p.6.) Corbus's argument fails. 
Nothing in the restitution statutes, or the case law interpreting those statutes, 
requires a court to evaluate the subjective intent of a victim in responding to a 
defendant's criminal actions before awarding restitution. Nor has Corbus cited any 
authority for the proposition that a victim's subjective intent constitutes an 
intervening "cause" excusing a defendant from the consequences of his actions. 
Rather, the law only requires a "causal connection between the conduct for which 
the defendant is convicted and the damages the victim suffers." Schultz at *2. The 
district court found the requisite connection in this case, stating: 
The victim in this case is Terry Clark. Mr. Clark was a 
passenger in the defendant's vehicle when he was engaging in the 
acts of Felony Eluding and Reckless Driving. During the police chase, 
Mr. Clark, fearing for his safety, got out of the defendant's vehicle while 
it was moving and was seriously injured. The restitution investigator 
has submitted information showing that Mr. Clark's medical bills totaled 
$18,203.67. It is this amount that is sought in restitution from the 
defendant. 
In the court's view, there is sufficient causal connection between 
the conduct for which the defendant was convicted and the injuries Mr. 
Clark sustained. Mr. Clark was afraid because he was a passenger in 
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the defendant's vehicle which he was driving at a high rate of speed 
with his headlights off on a road where other vehicles were located. It 
was not unreasonable for Mr. Clark to decide that he might be better 
off 'bailing out' of the vehicle rather than risk more serious injuries in 
the event that the defendant wrecked the vehicle. There is no reason 
to believe that Mr. Clark would have left the defendant's vehicle, while 
it was moving, had the defendant not been engaged in the criminal 
actions that constituted Felony Eluding and Reckless Driving. See, 
e.g., State v. Hill, 2002 WL 31082005, *1-2 (Wash. Ct. App.) 
(Defendant, convicted of assault, could be required to pay restitution to 
a victim, who, after the assault, panicked and fled away in a car at a 
high rate of speed and lost control of the car and crashed after running 
a red light at an intersection; sufficient causal connection existed 
because the victim's actions were "'not only foreseeable, but highly 
likely. "'). 
(R., pp.163-64.) 
That Corbus believes Mr. Clark jumped out of his moving vehicle for a 
different reason is purely speculative and ultimately irrelevant so long as there is a 
connection between Corbus's criminal conduct - felony eluding and reckless driving 
- and Mr. Clark's injuries. Whether Mr. Clark wanted to exit Corbus's moving 
vehicle to reduce his risk of injury or to avoid being charged with a probation 
violation (a more unlikely motivation given that he could be charged with a probation 
violation even if he jumped out), does not break the causal connection since either 
reason was the direct result of Corbus's criminal conduct. Corbus's reliance on 
State v. Shafer, 144 Idaho 370, 161 P.3d 689 (Ct. App. 2007), for a contrary 
conclusion is misplaced. 
Shafer was charged with and convicted of leaving the scene of an injury 
accident for leaving the scene without providing any identification or assistance after 
his car "collided with another vehicle in an intersection." Shafer, 144 Idaho at 371, 
161 P.3d at 690. ''The other driver's car was a total loss, and she suffered several 
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injuries requiring medical attention." lli. Shafer pled guilty and agreed to pay 
restitution, but later objected to paying restitution "arguing that the[ ] damages were 
not attributable to the crime to which he had pleaded guilty - leaving the scene of 
the accident - but rather to the accident itself." Id. The district court agreed, but 
ordered Shafer to nevertheless pay restitution since he "had consented to pay [it] as 
a term of his plea agreement." lli. Shafer appealed. 
On appeal, the Court of Appeals ultimately concluded Shafer was required to 
pay restitution pursuant to the plea agreement, but in dicta agreed with Shafer and 
the district court that there was no causal connection between the offense to which 
Shafer pled guilty and the requested restitution. Shafer, 144 Idaho at 372-75, 161 
P.3d at 691-94. In doing so, the Court of Appeals reasoned that although the fact of 
an accident is an element of leaving the scene of an injury accident, because the 
"State need not prove that the defendant was responsible for the accident, and a 
guilty plea for leaving an injury accident is not an admission of fault in the accident 
itself," imposing restitution based solely on a conviction of that crime is insufficient to 
support an order of restitution under I.C. § 19-5304. lli. at 373, 161 P.3d at 692. 
The Court of Appeals, however, acknowledged the possibility "that a victim could 
suffer injuries from a driver's unlawfully leaving the scene, as where the victim's 
injuries are aggravated or death results because the defendant did not stop and 
render aid," but concluded that because there was "no evidence of such damages in 
th[at] case," there was no basis for concluding the victim suffered economic loss as 
a result of Shafer's criminal conduct. lli. 
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Unlike in Shafer, a causal connection exists between the crimes to which 
Corbus pled guilty and Mr. Clark's injuries. The elements of felony eluding are: (1) 
"willfully flee[ing] or attempt[ing] to elude a pursuing police vehicle when given a 
visual or audible signal to bring the vehicle to a stop" while (2) (a) "[t]ravel[ing] in 
excess of thirty (30) miles per hour above the posted speed limit;" (b) "[c]aus[ing] 
damage to the property of another or bodily injury to another;" (c) driving "in a 
manner as to endanger or likely to endanger the property of another or the person of 
another;" or (d) "[I]eav[ing] the state." I.C. § 49-1404(1)-(2). The elements of 
reckless driving are: (1) driving "carelessly and heedlessly or without due caution 
and circumspection;" and (2) "at a speed or in a manner as to endanger or be likely 
to endanger any person or property, or who passes when there is a line in his lane 
indicating a sight distance restriction." I.C. § 49-1401. 
With respect to felony eluding, the state's information alleged Corbus eluded 
law enforcement, "and in so doing either:" 
(a) traveled in excess of thirty (30) miles per hour above the posted 
speed limit, to-wit: in excess of 100 m.p.h. in a 55 and/or 65 m.p.h. 
speed zone(s) or (b) drove his vehicle in a manner as to endanger or 
be likely to endanger the property of another or the person of another, 
to-wit: the Defendant drove in a reckless manner including speeding in 
excess of 100 m.p.h., passing other vehicles, and turning off his 
headlights after sunset, .... 
(R., p.17 (emphasis added).) 
Similarly, the state alleged Corbus committed the crime of reckless driving by 
driving "carelessly and heedlessly; without due caution and Circumspection and/or at 
a speed or in a manner to be likely to endanger persons or property; by driving in 
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excess of 100 m.p.h. with his headlights tumed off after 9:18 p.m., with other 
vehicles on the roadway." (R., p.1?) 
The elements of both reckless driving and felony eluding, and the manner in 
which they were charged, establish a connection between the criminal conduct and 
endangering another person - in this case, Mr. Clark. Even if the elements and 
charging language alone do not establish a connection, there was a connection in 
this case since Mr. Clark's injuries were sustained in reaction to Corbus's criminal 
conduct. The district court, therefore correctly concluded there was a "sufficient 
causal connection between the conduct for which the defendant was convicted and 
the injuries Mr. Clark sustained." (R., p.164.) Corbus has failed to establish 
otherwise. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's Order 
of Restitution. 
DATED this 30th day of March 2009. 
JE~ELLO 
Deputy Attorney General 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 30th day of March 2009, served a true 
and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a copy 
addressed to: 
ERIC FREDERICKSEN 
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho 
Supreme Court Clerk's office. 
JES 
Dep y Attomey General 
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